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Abstract

Project failure in the Information Technology (IT) sector is well documented in
the literature; project managers miss their target budgets and schedules more than twice
as often as they meet them. Traditional project management methodologies initially
developed for the large-scale engineering projects of the 1950’s, while still relevant and
useful, are reductionist in nature and are therefore missing a systems approach that
concentrates on knowledge creation before, during and after a project. The research
presented herein will demonstrate the role of system dynamics in augmenting a project’s
control processes, as well as the skill set used by the project manager. Research from a
wide variety of projects within the information technology sector will be synthesized,
some using system dynamics methodologies, and will serve as the basis to comparatively
analyze the value added using this novel project management approach. The project
dynamics and lessons learned within will illustrate the complex interactions and feedback
structures inherent in all projects, as well as seek to educate project managers on their
cause-effect relationships. Furthermore, the research will illustrate problematic project
dynamics, using various conceptual models, and suggest the need to integrate system
dynamics methodologies for project management into traditional project management
processes and bodies of knowledge instead of solely relying on them as a post-mortem
tool for project analysis.

viii

I. Introduction
While the discipline of project management has been around since early
civilization, it has gained importance in recent decades as a rapidly growing management
discipline in a wide variety of public and private organizations. Its modern practice began
in the 1950’s with large defense, aerospace engineering and construction projects;
however, recent trends such as globalization, corporate down-sizing, shorter product life
cycles, accelerated technological change and increased market competition have all
contributed to what David Cleland, a project management scholar, refers to as the rise of
the “Age of Project Management” (Gray and Larson 2000). One particular class of
projects (information technology) fail at an alarming rate (Standish Group 2009) and the
discipline remains inadequately researched and poorly understood compared to the other
more established management disciplines like operations management and new product
development. For example, out of the more than 7000 Harvard Business School case
studies, only 2% mention the discipline of project management and out of those there are
only a few dozen that deal with real project management related issues (Shenhar, Dvir
2007).
Project failures, delays and cost over-runs are all well documented in the literature
and adequately illustrate the problems all organizations face with their project related
initiatives. According to a Standish Group study (2009), only 32 percent of information
technology (IT) projects are successful, 24 percent are failures, and 44 percent were
completed but delivered late, over budget and/or without the required scope. In other
words, over two-thirds of all IT projects either fail to deliver on the project management
plan but still deliver something, or simply never produce a deliverable at all. Some other
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studies show that upwards of 85 percent of projects, across a wide range of industries,
miss their scheduling and budget goals; on average, these failed projects miss their
schedule goals by as much as 70 percent and their budget goals by as much as 60 percent
(Shenhar and Dvir, 1993). However, 100 and 200 percent cost over runs very common as
well (Sterman 1992).
Multiple operational methods have been deployed since the 1950’s to address the
need to better manage projects; however, there has been considerable emphasis on
methodologies and tools (e.g. PERT, Work Breakdown Structure, Critical Path Method,
GANT Charts, Earned Value Analysis) that focus on dissecting projects into their
component parts and emphasizing that if each part can be understood and managed the
project as a whole can be understood and managed. These tools are focused on providing
important and useful methods for operational concerns and project planning; however,
some studies suggest that the main causes of project failure lie predominantly in strategic
areas such as the political, legal and behavioral aspects of projects (Rodrigues and
Bowers 1997).
Moreover, regardless of the increased success of these operational tools, projects
still routinely fail and cost organizations in both the private and public sectors $80 - $145
billion per year in the process (Standish Group 2009). These reductionist strategies to
project control are useful models; however, they are myopic because they often times fail
to properly account for the project’s macro view and the reality that slight perturbations
in any of the component parts of a project schedule can have cascading and escalating
effects on other work packages and the project as a whole; thereby causing increased
error rates and the potential to miss schedule and budget targets. Poor project success
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rates suggest the need to not only better theoretically define and understand the
discipline, but to also reexamine the standard methodologies used and develop new
strategies to modify, replace or augment those traditional approaches.
System Dynamics is one area of research that has begun to tackle this problem
from the strategic perspective and aid in management’s ability to understand complex
socio-technical systems. It is a methodology used by both industry and academia to
model, simulate and manage complex feedback mechanisms (System Dynamics Society
2009). Such mechanisms are universally present in large IT projects and, as the literature
suggests, often the cause of project failure. Much like other systems approaches to
problem solving, system dynamics focuses more attention on the higher level dynamics
(i.e. feedback) that exists between project components. These dynamics can often
produce counter-intuitive behavior and directly affect project success rates. Within a
system dynamics framework, less attention is paid to traditional Project Management
Institute (PMI) models and methodologies such as Program Evaluation and Review
Technique (PERT), Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), GANT charts and Earned Value
Analysis (EVA), which serve as complimentary toolsets, but are considered to be more
detailed operational methods for project management.
The goal for this paper is to present a comparative analysis between traditional
models and methods of project management and the recent developments in the use of
system dynamics to augment the more traditional operational approaches with a higher
level strategic understanding of how certain project dynamics affect project outcomes. A
review of the project management and system dynamics literature will serve as the basis
for the research and provide the foundation to draw conclusions about system dynamics’
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value to the project management body of knowledge. The intent here is not to build a
running quantitative system dynamics model, but rather synthesize existing research and
models, into an integrated framework of lessons learned that will help project managers
in the field better understand the dynamic and complex nature of projects and the purpose
and value of the system dynamics methodology. Based on this research, suggestions for
future research will be presented, such as the development of quantitative models that are
dynamic in nature and integrated into the traditional PMI body of knowledge and project
management framework. The paper will explore the possibility of integrating system
dynamics models into the project management process instead of the more traditional
method of using them strictly as a post-mortem performance analysis tool.

II. The Problem
a. Current State of Project Performance
Contemporary business processes are more complex than in decades past and
resemble structures with more interrelationships and interdependencies. It is becoming
clear that the conventional (i.e. reductionist) project management methods are inadequate
for handling this new era of complexity. The Project Management Institute recognizes
this trend and research is currently underway by PMI, as well as others in academia, to
learn how best to manage complex projects (Haas 2009). Management styles and
organizational structures are also following this trend towards complexity. Historically,
managers subscribed to a Newtonian philosophy of management resembling a machine
model predicated on linear thinking, control theory and predictability; this model is
proving very difficult to tender in the new era of complexity (Lewis 2008, Hart 2009,
Haas 2009). Some executives are even rejecting traditional organizational structures in
favor of more complex models, like the matrix organization, or another type that Haas
(2009) refers to as “alliances,” whereby an organization creates an organizational
structure comprised of complex interrelationships between suppliers, partners, regulatory
entities, customers and sometimes even competitors. Out of the complex organizations,
complex projects are born.
The project management literature over the last three decades suggests a poor
performance record for complex IT projects; particularly with regards to software
development projects (Brooks 1975, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, Rodrigues 1996,
Dorsey 2000, Lewis 2008, Haas 2009, Hart 2009). Some of the literature following this
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trend references The CHAOS Report by the Standish Group (2009), which is considered
to be the most comprehensive, ground-breaking study to-date on information technology
related project performance. Since its first release in 1994, the Standish Group has
followed the IT industry’s performance, or lack thereof, and has regularly updated The
CHAOS REPORT roughly every two years.
Successful

Failed

Challenged

Projects

Projects

Projects

2008

32%

24%

44%

2006

35%

19%

46%

2004

29%

18%

53%

2000

28%

23%

49%

1998

26%

28%

44%

1996

27%

40%

33%

1994

16%

31%

53%

Year

Table 1: CHAOS Report for IT project performance from 1994-2008 (Standish Group 2009).

The original report in 1994 uncovered significant failure rates for IT projects (e.g.
web application development, software development, systems integration) and estimated
that these failures cost government agencies and corporations $80 billion - $145 billion
per year (Standish Group 2009). The report features three categories of project
performance – successful, challenged and failed. Successful projects refer to those that
were delivered on time, on budget and with the desired scope. Challenged projects refer
to those where the project was completed but was delivered late, over budget and without
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the required scope. Failed projects refer to those where the project was not completed,
canceled or delivered something of no value to the customer.
While The CHAOS Report data suggests a marginal improvement in project
performance between 1994 and 2008, it also highlights the continued challenges facing
the IT industry and the project management discipline, as well as the recent dip in project
performance between 2006 and 2008. Furthermore, the data is even more troubling when
one considers that although 32 percent of projects were on time and on budget, most were
originally over-estimated (Standish Group 2009). Focus groups indicated that “IT
executives reported that they first get their best estimates, multiply by two and then add a
half. It should not be surprising therefore, that the majority of these successful projects
were already 150% over budget before they began” (Standish Group 2001).
In addition, the research suggests that the bigger the size of the project, which
often times correlates to higher project complexity, the higher the failure rate (Standish
Group 1999). Johnson states, "seventy-three percent of projects with labor cost of less
than $750,000 succeed, but only 3 percent of projects a with labor cost of over $10
million succeed. I would venture to say the 3 percent that succeed succeeded because
they overestimated their budget, not because they were managed properly" (COOK
2008). The research suggests there are three metrics that are key to predicting, with a
high degree of certainty, whether or not a project will be successful – the project size, the
project duration and the size of the project team. The research confirms what many
project managers may have sensed all along; that smaller projects with shorter durations
and smaller teams have a better chance at success compared to projects that are large with
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long durations. The 2001 report suggests a sweet spot for projects to be at four months,
with four team members and a cost of less than $500,000 (Standish Group 2001).
Haas (2009) suggests that the reason for the overall improvement in projects, as
seen in the CHAOS Report, is due to the following three factors: 1) Average project costs
has been reduced by more than half since 2001; 2) more emphasis has been placed on
using project managers and project management methodologies for complex IT projects;
and 3) better methodologies and tools for change/configuration management have been
developed and deployed. However, considering that the most recent data shows over twothirds of all IT projects were over budget, over schedule or failed outright, and the fact
that the Standish Group (2009) predicts that the number of critical projects will double
every year it is apparent that the industry and the discipline still have a considerable
challenge ahead to increase project performance to levels where management has
confidence in the investments associated with these often large scale and dynamically
complex projects.
Shenhar and Dvir (2007) recently conducted a study which spanned 15 years and
more than 600 complex projects across the globe in business, non-profit and government
sectors. Their research demonstrates yet another example of poor project performance
when one considers that 85 percent of the projects studied failed to meet budget and
schedule goals. On average, schedules were overrun by 70 percent and budgets by 60
percent (Shenhar Dvir, 2007). They concluded that “executives as well as project teams
failed to appreciate up front the extent of uncertainty and complexity involved (or failed
to communicate this extent to each other) and failed to adapt their management style to
the situation” (Shenhar Dvir 2007). Furthermore, in the public sector, the Office of
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Management and Budget (OMB) conducted a study in 2003 that concluded there was an
unsustainable risk of failure among 771 projects with a total cost of $20.9 billion
included in the fiscal year 2004 budget (OMB 2003).
b. Project Complexity and the Case for New Models
Complex projects require a team effort of experienced project managers, technical
architects, developers, business analysts and executive leadership with a keen eye on
strategy. These teams consist of complex adaptive social systems nested in diverse
organizations, which in turn are nested in our increasingly dynamic economic, political
and social environments. Once an organization defines the right projects to undertake, the
question as to how to best do the projects (i.e. what methodology/process) becomes
critical to the success of the project (Haas 2009). While traditional methods of project
management are still relevant and useful, they are not always the best methodologies to
select in today’s environment. Projects in the 21st century require new methods of
thinking and new approaches, some of which might replace traditional methods and some
of which will augment them. The Project Complexity Model pioneered by Haas (2009)
provides the project manager with a three step process to ensure that:
1. A project leader with the appropriate skill set is assigned
2. The project leader selects the appropriate project cycle
3. The management style selected is appropriate given the project’s level of
complexity.
The traditional approach to project management resembles a logical, linear,
reductionist process to achieve a goal. It primarily involves the management of tasks and
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making sure those task are completed on time, within budget constraints and to the
technical specifications of the customer. The methodology is a well defined one whereby
the project manager/team performs the following linear progression:
1. Define the problem
2. Decompose the problem into its component parts (milestones, work-packages,
activities)
3. Develop a plan to address the problem
4. Execute the work addressed in the plan
5. Integrate the decomposed parts into the final solution
6. Deliver/deploy the solution
The logic behind the traditional approach is that if we can reduce the problem down
to manageable components, develop a plan to manage those components and then
execute and control changes to that highly structured plan, we can therefore reduce the
overall complexity and risk associated with the project (Project Management Institute
PMI 2008, Gido and Clements 2009, Haas 2009, Lewis 2008). This methodology, born
out of mathematical models and structured planning approaches to manage large
aerospace engineering and construction projects of the 1950’s, works well for projects
where requirements are well understood and stable. However, projects in the information
technology sector, and more specifically software projects, are often times highly
complex, with volatile and ambiguous requirements; therefore, a new paradigm is
emerging; one that is more complex, adaptive, agile and iterative (Loch et al 2006, Haas
2009).
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Project Complexity Factors
1. Large scope
2. Long duration
3. Urgent
4. Volitile requirements
5. Ambiguous requirements
6. Politically sensitive
7. Highly Visible
8. Large scale cultural

9. Heavily dependent on external
factors/constratints
10. Unproven technology
11. Vague business problems,
opportunities or solutions
12. Multiple dispersed and diverse cross‐
functional teams

Figure 1: Twelve factors that produce complex projects (Haas 2009). Modern information technology
projects often consist of several of these factors leading to increased project complexity and the
associated increased project performance risks.

The Project Management Research Program is currently exploring the application
of complexity theory to project management and what that area of science can provide to
better understand the nature of complex projects (Haas 2009). In addition, new and more
adaptive system development methodologies are emerging that emphasize agile and
iterative techniques instead of the more traditional approaches, which place more
emphasis on planning and control. A hybridization of these two methods is most likely
the answer to handling different types of projects appropriately.
c. Software Development Projects
Software and web application development projects are complex in nature,
involving technical knowledge-work that does not produce the linear relationships
between system variables (e.g. the relationship between number of developers and lines
of bug-fee code) often found in more tangible product production such as manufacturing
and construction. For example, if one were to paint a house, the project’s schedule length
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would decrease almost linearly (up to a certain point) based on how many painters the
project manager had for the task; this is not the case with IT projects and software/web
application development in particular. Adding an extra developer to a project does not
ensure that twice as many lines of bug-free code will be deployed. The complexity
inherent in software development, and the project management practices that seek to
control and improve its performance, have been well studied in recent decades and can be
traced back as far as a report by the Comptroller General in 1979 citing the “software
crisis” that existed in the federal government (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991). The
report concluded that “the government got for its money less than 2 percent of the total
value of the contracts” (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, 3). Project performance for
software development has improved marginally since then but is still deficient according
to the Standish Group’s Chaos report (2009). Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991)
produced a pioneering study in an attempt to understand the systemic issues involving
software development and produce a working quantitative model that illustrates the
complex interactions and causal connections between variables affecting software
development.
Figure 2 illustrates a high level subsystem diagram for software development and
demonstrates the key interactions between the planning, controlling, human resources
management and software production components of any software development effort.
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) suggest that in order to get a better understanding of
the software development process we needed a fully integrated model that took other
variables into account instead of the traditional practice of focusing solely on the
software production subsystem.
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Figure 2: Fully integrated subsystem diagram for software development project dynamics (AbdelHamid and Madnick 1991).

The Human Resource subsystem is comprised of functions such as hiring, training
and assimilation. Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) recognized that these functions do
not operate as independent and exogenous variables to the system, but rather as
endogenous variables that both affect and are affected by the other subsystems. For
example, the Work Force Available influences the allocation of human resources in the
Software Production subsystem and both the Controlling subsystem and Planning
subsystem have a direct affect on the Human Resource subsystem, and therefore the
Workforce Available (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991).
The Planning subsystem accounts for project estimation activities that directly
affect both the project schedule and the work force needed to develop the software.
Estimates are initially produced and subsequently revised throughout the life-cycle of the
project. These estimates create the environment in which management interventions, such

14
as adding more people to the project or adjusting the project schedule, take place and can
lead to some of the unintended and counter-intuitive project behaviors referenced in
Figure 13.
The Software Production subsystem comprises of four development activities:
development, quality assurance, rework and testing. The Controlling subsystem
represents those activities by which project managers track progress in development
activities vs. the project plan and make adjustments. Unfortunately, tracking progress in
software development is extremely difficult because the intended product (i.e.
“software”) remains intangible for most of the development process. This makes it very
difficult for both developers and the project managers to determine how far along the
project has progressed (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, Hart 2009).
As previously mentioned, this is one of the major differences between information
systems/software development project management control and accounts for much of the
complexity and performance problems associated with managing software projects. The
inability to accurately measure progress directly affects the project manager’s ability to
effectively control the project schedule, budget and performance. Abdel-Hamid and
Madnick (1991) suggest this is primarily the result of how software development projects
are measured, using the surrogate variable, consumptions of resources, as a way to
measure progress instead of a more tangible method you might see in manufacturing or
construction. They assert that along with underestimation, this inability to precisely
measure software project progress is one of the contributing factors in producing the 90%
syndrome – a common form of project failure where estimates of the fraction of work
completed reaches roughly 90% completion according to the original project schedule but
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then stalls as the task completion rate starts to decrease. In some cases the project takes
just as long if not longer to finish the final 10% as it did to finish the first 90% (AbdelHamid 1990, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1988, 1991, Ford and Sterman 2003, Lyneis
and Ford 2007, Hart 2009).
d. The 90% Syndrome in Systems/Software Development
In the project management and software development literature the 90%
syndrome refers to a type of project failure where estimates of the fraction of work
completed reaches roughly 90% according to the original project schedule but then stalls
(Abdel-Hamid 1988). Sterman (1992) concisely defines the syndrome by stating that “a
project is thought to be 90% complete for half the total time required” (1992, 1). In more
layman’s terms, projects have an uncanny way of appearing to be on target and
proceeding as planned until they near their end; however, even though project
management planning and control took place, the rate of progress stalls as the scope of
the endeavor grows, the resource requirements increase and/or the errors made early on in
the development process lead to schedule pressure, schedule slippage, overtime, poor
product quality and potentially yet more rework.
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Characteristics of the 90% Syndrome
Cummulative Progress (%)

120
100
80
60
Planned Progress
40

Actual Progress

20
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Weeks

Figure 3: Classic S-shaped limits to growth representation of the 90% syndrome. Cumulative
progress increases at a decreasing rate once the project nears 90% completion according to the
original project plan (Ford and Sterman 2003).

There are several reasons cited in the literature for this project phenomenon.
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) attribute it primarily to the interaction between two
factors: project size (i.e. scope) underestimation and man-day underestimation (i.e.
human resources). As one might expect, if the project scope is underestimated from the
beginning there is a greater chance for the 90% syndrome to appear due to the following
characteristics surrounding many software development projects. Early on in the project,
the ability of the project manager to effectively measure progress is hampered because
software is mostly intangible for much of its development and progress is often measured
by the rate of resource expenditures instead of actual accomplishments (e.g. bug-free
lines of code or functioning software modules); this in turn creates the illusion that the
project is on schedule (Abdel-Hamid 1991).
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Once the project progresses into its later stages, the discrepancy between
resources expenditures and completed tasks becomes increasingly apparent to both the
project team members and the project manager. This produces a better appreciation for
the actual amount of work left; often times the inevitable discovery and underestimation
of rework exacerbates the syndrome, leading to a prolonged stall or outright failure (Ford
and Sterman 2003). Furthermore, progress can continue to decline as a result of illadvised managerial responses to the schedule failure. For example, such “corrective
actions” as adding more developers, pushing the deadline, engaging in concurrent
development and/or requiring overtime, produce what Ford and Lyneis (2007) categorize
as “ripple” and “knock-on” effects. These actions often activate feedback dynamics,
induced and exacerbated by management interventions, which can have the unintended
consequence of producing an increase in the error rate, further reduced productivity and
further delays.
The second factor Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) attribute to the syndrome is
man-day underestimation. According to their model, the syndrome is more severe when
man-day requirements are underestimated than it is when size is underestimated (AbdelHamid and Madnick, 1991). At first this might appear to be somewhat counterintuitive;
however, a closer examination of the case study and model results reveals that when size
is underestimated the syndrome is less severe for two reasons: 1) because problems with
the estimation of project scope tend to be detected faster in the project life cycle than
problems with labor estimates and size underestimation, and 2) because when size is
underestimated, and subsequently detected in the early stages of the project, man-days
estimates are often revised appropriately (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1991).
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Man-day requirements often remain undetected until late in the life cycle when
the majority of the budgeted man-days have been consumed; this occurs because it isn’t
until the later stages of a project when the budgeted man-days are exhausted and the team
members are able to effectively perceive how productive they have actually been (AbdelHamid and Madnick 1991). Bringing additional resources into the project during its
critical late stages (when the rework cycle starts to dominate), instead of earlier in the
project lifecycle, increases the project’s potential for Brooks’ Law (i.e. adding resources
to a late software projects only makes it later), as well as other supporting ripple and
knock-on effects (Lyneis and Ford 2007), further degrading schedule/project performance
(Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991).
In addition to Abdel-Hamid and Madnick’s assertions on the causes for the 90%
syndrome, Ford and Sterman (2003) also provided insights through their study of
concurrent engineering projects. Concurrent engineering refers to a method by which
certain tasks, work packages and/or project milestones are developed in parallel rather
than serial formation. For example, in the case of software development, a project
manager might choose to overlap (i.e. work in parallel) the design and development tasks
in an effort to reduce the total schedule length of those task, as compared to working
them in serial order.
Ford and Sterman (2003) developed a system dynamics model to better
understand the interactions between the process structure of concurrent development and
the project team members’ behavioral decision-making processes. Their model
demonstrates the strength behind the system dynamics methodology; its ability to
integrate managerial decision-making into the various physical information processes
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involved in any software development effort. The results from their research illustrate
how the interaction between development processes (e.g. overlapping activities/task
sequencing, activity durations and rework), as well as the behaviors of management and
developers deliberately concealing rework (i.e. “the Liars Club”), creates a detrimental
dynamic leading to unplanned iterations and a lower quality product at a higher than
estimated cost (Ford and Sterman 2003). They assert that concurrent engineering actually
increases the risk of producing the 90% syndrome because it increases a project’s
vulnerability to multiple iterations and errors, as well as actually increasing the fraction
of work requiring changes or additional iterations (Ford and Sterman 2003).
Their research outlines the “Liar’s Club” as a social/behavioral phenomenon in
projects whereby project teams conceal rework in order to avoid the responsibility of
failure, prevent blame escalation or retaliation from peers and to solve their own
problems under cover and free from management intervention. This behavior illustrates
the importance of considering (i.e. factoring them into models) individual and team
behaviors, a practiced widely used in system dynamics modeling, when devising policies
to improve project performance in concurrent development projects (Ford and Sterman
2003). According to Ford and Sterman (2003, 217), “Process changes cannot improve
concurrent development project performance if they do not also address the behaviors
that drive iteration cycles such as the policy of concealing rework requirements.” In other
words, without considering and addressing how people truly behave in socio-technical
systems, the project manager can continue in vain to tweak development processes ad
infinitum, only to realize that the project team’s socio-cultural incentive structure
continues to wreak havoc on the final project outcome.

20
The literature referenced in this research focuses on the use of system dynamics
modeling and simulation, which provides a better understanding of the project behaviors,
such as the aforementioned 90% syndrome, as well as quantitative data to support the
anecdotal evidence encountered by many project managers in the field. The goal for
project managers should be to first develop a richer understanding of dynamic project
behaviors, which include individual, management and project planning/estimation
behaviors. Armed with that knowledge, they must use it to develop better strategies for
handling project perturbations in a way that mitigates the risk of the 90% syndrome.
These strategies should include, but are not limited to the use of, 1) better
estimation tools for both project size and man-days requirements, remembering that
project estimates create project behaviors and vice versa; the methods to also properly
account for rework cycles and their critical position late in the project life-cycle, as well
as the man-day considerations needed to effectively handle them, 2) improved methods to
account for, manage and adjust the socio-cultural incentive structures associated with the
concealment of rework (i.e. the Liar’s Club); the literature suggests agile development as
a methodology to increase cycle speed and mitigate the syndrome’s risks; however,
management’s communication styles/patterns, as well as their policies towards rework,
must not institutionalize the desire to conceal problems and hide the “bad news,” and
lastly, 3) the development, and use of, commercially available software project
management simulation tools (e.g. system dynamics models) that are widely accessible,
intuitive, extensible, relevant and provide project managers with a robust learning
environment from which to learn and become better dynamically driven decision makers.
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Each one of these suggested strategies represents a component that must be
considered in any attempt to improve the marginal success rate of software development
and information technology projects. Simply addressing whichever component solution is
conveniently located in close proximity has the potential to deliver minor incremental
improvements, no improvements, or worse yet, aggravate the development process and
deliver worse results than before.

III. Augmenting Traditional Project Management Methodologies using System
Dynamics Lessons Learned
a. What is System Dynamics?
System Dynamics is a modeling and simulation methodology pioneered by Jay
Forester at the MIT School of Management in the 1950’s and grounded in the
mathematical theories of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control. Initially termed
Industrial Dynamics, it was used by management teams who recognized the
counterintuitive nature of their production systems and needed a problem solving method
for analyzing the complex and dynamic nature of their production processes, inventories
and services (Sterman 2000). Sterman (2000) concisely, yet precisely, describes it as, “a
method to enhance learning in complex systems.” Since its inception, the methodology
has been applied across a wide spectrum to solve problems and assist managers in the
policy and decision making process.
The discipline is predicated on the following main premises (Sterman 2000,
Meadows 2008, Senge 1990)
1. The behavior of any system, in other words its output, is principally
caused by its structure and associated interrelationships and
interdependencies between system components or variables.
2. The system structure includes not only the physical aspects of the system
but the policies and procedures that govern organizational decisionmaking.

23
3. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Our intuitive judgment
proves to be unreliable in understanding system behavior over time even
when we think we fully understand the individual components of the
system.
4. All systems involve feedback processes which often produce counterintuitive system behavior.
5. The key to understanding a system is to understand the causal connections
and feedback structures that exist and how those interrelationships
dynamically influence system behavior over time.
One of the most fertile application areas for the system dynamics methodology is
within the discipline of project management and, more specifically, the discipline’s
application to software development and construction (Sterman 2000). In order to
properly understand system dynamics, and its many contributions to project management,
it is important to grasp some of the core concepts central to systems thinking, such as
event-oriented vs. systems-oriented worldviews, mental models, single-loop vs. doubleloop learning, stocks, flows, feedback and delays.
i.

Event-oriented vs. Systems-oriented world views

Central to the system dynamics methodology are the concepts of a systemsoriented world view (figure 4), as opposed to the event-oriented worldview (figure 5).
Quite often, these system characteristics govern the dynamic behavior of the systems
themselves, leading many systems thinkers to the realization that a system’s output is
more a function of the relationships between system components, than simply the sum of
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each component. In other words, the output for a system/project is much more than the
sum of all its parts (Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008, Senge 1990).

Goals
Problem

Decision

Results

Situation

Figure 4: An event-oriented world view assumes the problem is static in nature and develops as a
result of some event or combination of events (Sterman 2000).

Side Effects
Actions of Others

Decisions

Environment

Goals

Goals of
Other Agents

Figure 5: A systems-oriented world view assumes the problem is dynamic in nature and arises as a
natural consequence of dynamic relationships between the various system components. It broadens
the scope of the model boundary, accounts for other actors, accounts for feedback dynamics and
attempts to account for potential unintended consequences (Sterman 2000).

For example, a project manager would be hard pressed to understand, or predict,
the true outcome of any project by simply dissecting it down to its component part tasks,
estimating, planning and scheduling the project. That approach is ignorant to the more
holistic systems approach, which realizes that the slightest perturbations in any task can
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have cascading and escalating effects throughout the lifecycle of the project, leading to
increases in errors/rework, costs and schedule overruns. This higher level strategic
perspective is considered to be one of system dynamics’ major contributions to the
discipline of project management.
ii.

Mental Models and Single vs. Double-Loop Learning

Another core concept in system dynamics is the notion of mental models, which
refer to a person’s preconceived understanding about how some particular aspect of the
world works (Sterman 2000). Senge (1990) describes mental models as “deeply ingrained
assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures of images that influence how we
understand the world and how we take action.” When we fail to recognize or subject our
mental models to scrutiny or testing, our ability to learn and better manage complex
systems is minimized. A systems approach to project management provides the project
manager with a methodology to formally identify, test and adjust mental models so
he/she can effectively understand and analyze all of the data presented instead of
embarking on a path using a static, faulty or biased cognitive foundation. Constantly
challenging our mental models leads to the process of double-loop learning (Sterman
2000).
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Real World

Real World

Decisions

Strategy, Structure,
Decision Rules

Information
Feedback

Mental Models of
the Real World

Decisions

Strategy, Structure,
Decision Rules

Information
Feedback

Mental Models of
the Real World

Figure 6: Mental models are important variables in problem solving activities and should be
perpetually challenged as information feedback increases. These diagrams illustrate the difference
between single loop learning (left) and double loop learning (right); they demonstrate how double
loop learning uses information feedback from the system to refine, or in some cases replace, deeply
held biases associated with the object of study, which in turn go on to affect our strategies and
policies and produce yet more information feedback (Sterman 2000).

Galileo and Lord Kelvin both emphasized the importance of studying and
quantifying the phenomena we wish to understand, with Kelvin stating, “to measure is to
know.” A common maxim in the project management community also states that you
cannot manage what you cannot measure, which is also commonly referred to as
“management by fact,” compared to the opposite philosophy of intuitive decisionmaking. Management by fact is advantageous compared to intuitive decision-making
because it exposes the mangers mental models and challenges them to be continually reexamined when the data supporting those mental models changes (i.e. double-loop
learning). This is of course is not without difficulty when one considers the myriad of
variables present in any decision-making process that are either un-quantifiable, or very
difficult to establish consensus on how to properly quantify the variable.
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For example, in software development, variables such as customer satisfaction,
team moral, team knowledge/expertise, project scope and latent software errors are all
representative of variables Hart (2008) refers to as “fuzzy” or “soft variables;” these
variables challenge the manager to provide data, and as Hart (2008) suggests, eventually
“encounter the wall of measurability.” Thus, as managers, if we accept the philosophy
inherent in managing by fact we are forced to ignore important soft variables present in
our project. Ignoring these variables can produce negative systemic effects when
intervention strategies are planned without regard to the effect these soft variables have
on the intervention’s outcome; sometimes producing counter-intuitive side effects that
ultimately degrade project performance.
Properly integrating these soft variables into operational models is difficult
practice; however, taking the easy way out and excluding them can lead to poorly
performing intervention strategies and what Sterman (2000) and Meadows (2008) refer to
as policy resistance, or “the tendency for interventions to be delayed, diluted, or defeated
by the response of the system to the intervention itself” (Sterman 2000, 5). As Senge
(1990, 60) wisely states, “the easy way out usually leads right back in.” System dynamics
for project management provides a methodology for effectively building both theoretical
and quantitative models that integrate hard and soft variables into one model, properly
illustrating the cause-effect relationships and systemic feedback structures.
iii.

Stocks, Flows and Causal Loop Diagrams

If one were to conceptualize the previously mentioned concepts as the
philosophical foundations for systems thinking, then the concepts of stocks, flows and
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causal loop diagrams would be considered its language. Peter Senge (1990) says the
following regarding causal loop diagramming and the language of systems thinking:
“Language shapes perception. What we see depends on what we are prepared to
see. Western languages, with their subject-verb-object structure, are biased toward
a linear view. If we want to see system-wide interrelationships, we need a
language of interrelationships, a language made up of circles. … Such a language
is important in facing dynamically complex issues and strategic choices,
especially when individuals, teams and organizations need to see beyond events
and into the forces that shape change.”
More than any other tool, stock and flow diagrams lie at the foundation for
systems thinking. Such diagrams describe dynamic system structure, and can be used to
provide insight on the behaviors those structures produce. Without causal loop
diagramming and the stock and flow models they seed, there is limited potential to
expand system dynamics’ application via advanced tools such as: computer modeling and
simulation, and digital learning environments that mimic flight simulators.
Stocks are the system state variables, sometimes also referred to as system
“reservoirs” because they represent accumulations in any system (e.g number of software
defects, number of developers on a project). Meadows (2008) describes them as elements
in a system that you can count feel or measure at any given point in time. They are
accumulations and, therefore, are the main source of system buffer and delays. Flows on
the other hand are rates (i.e. processes) that affect the stock accumulations in an
increasing or decreasing fashion. If the sum of all inflows is greater than the sum of all
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outflows the stock level will increase; if the sum of all outflows is larger the stock will
decrease, and if inflows and outflows are equal, the system state remains in dynamic
equilibrium (Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008).
Understanding how system stocks and flows work, and their associated feedback
structure, is critical to understanding the true nature and output of any system. For
example, figure 7 depicts a simple population model stock and flow structure in an
attempt to illustrate this important concept with a very simple, narrow boundary system
(Sterman 2000). The Population stock is the system state variable we are concerned with
understanding. It represents a snapshot in time and can be quantified using people as the
units. The stock has two associated flows. On the left, there is the Births flow that adds
people to the population stock. The left side represents a self-reinforcing (i.e. positive)
feedback loop structure (R1), which indicates that as more people are born, and the
population grows in size, there will be more births, which in turn increases the
population. This kind of self-reinforcing feedback represents the classic exponential
growth archetype (Senge 1990, Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008). To the right of the
population stock is the Deaths flow. This side represents the balancing (i.e. negative)
feedback loop structure (B1), which indicates that as the population increases, the number
of deaths per unit of time will also increase, which in turn then decreases the population
stock in a “goal seeking” fashion.
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Population
Births
+
+

R1

Birth Fraction

B1

Deaths
+
Average Lifetime

Figure 7: Population Model Stock and Flow Structure (Sterman 2000).

The different polarities associated with each feedback arrow indicate how one
variable influences the other. In the case of Births, for example, as either the Birth
Fraction variable or the Population stock increases, so will the Births flow increase. The
positive polarity sign indicates that these variables move in the same direction. However,
on the right side balancing loop, as the Average Lifetime increases the number of deaths
decreases. The negative polarity indicates that these variables move in opposite
directions.
iv.

Feedback and Delays

The feedback structure of any system, and the delays associated with that system,
predominantly account for the system’s complex, dynamic and sometimes
counterintuitive behavior. Simply put, feedback refers to the interactions among system
variables. A feedback loop is formed when the inflows and outflows of a particular stock
(e.g. population) are affected by changes in that stock. So in the case of figure 7, the size
of the population stock directly affects both Births and Deaths flows and creates a
feedback loop for each. These interactions comprise the structure of the system and,
therefore, demonstrate how systems cause their own behaviors. Moreover, different
systems with similar feedback structures (i.e. system archetypes) tend to exhibit similar
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dynamic behaviors (Senge 1990, Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008). Figure 7 demonstrates
both types of feedback loops – positive (R1 self-reinforcing) and negative (B1
balancing). Positive feedback loops are runaway processes that produce exponential
growth (e.g. compounding interest of bank account). Conversely, balancing feedback
loops provide system stability and illustrate goal-seeking behavior (e.g. an increase in
inventory increases sales which then decreases inventory).
System delays, in addition to feedback structure, significantly determine system
behaviors. Sterman (2000) describes delays as “a process whose output lags behind its
input in some fashion.” Delays often produce stock oscillations, especially in a balancing
feedback loops. In IT projects, and more specifically software/web application
development, delays can affect the project’s outcome and complicate our ability to
understand and potentially change the system/project behavior. Hart (2008) suggests
there are three ways in which delays impact a system. First, delays produce reactions that
are not necessarily proportional to the system’s observed conditions. Second, project
team members act as if their decision making processes are based on current (real-time)
data when in fact systemic delays assure this is not the case. And lastly, delays affect our
ability to learn and properly decipher the cause-effect relationships among system
variables. In software development, delays can be witnessed in the lag-time inherent
between a customer’s perception of software quality and its actual quality, the delay
associated with new-hire productivity gains and from a traditional project management
perspective, the reality that project status reports often times do not truly reflect the
project’s progress and are not always based on current information regarding the project
(Hart 2008).
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b. Systemic Project Dynamics in Software Development – The Dynamics of
Schedule Pressure
The occurrence of the aforementioned 90% syndrome in projects is well
documented in the literature (Abdel-Hamid 1990, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1988,
1991, Sterman 1992, Ford and Sterman 2003, Lyneis and Ford 2007, Hart 2009) and the
causes for the syndrome are extensive and complex in nature. While Adbel-Hamid and
Madnick (1991) assert that the main causes can be attributed to underestimation and the
imprecise measurement of project progress, other studies by Ford and Sterman (2003),
Lyneis and Ford (2007) and Hart (2008) suggest the causes can be much wider and
involve other factors such as the interaction between factors such as “the rework cycle”
and project staffing trends throughout the lifecycle of the project.

Figure 8: A typical development project rework cycle. Work packages move from the original work
to do stock to the work done stock. In the process errors are discovered and sent back through the
development process for "rework" (Lyneis and Ford 2007).

The various behaviors, interrelationships and causal connections that typify most
software and web development projects are illustrated in Figures 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.
These dynamics represent common behaviors referenced in the project management
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literature and are important learning tools for project managers. They provide a
foundation for shared understanding of typical behaviors that can lead to poor project
performance, or outright failure. Furthermore, they can be used by project team members
to identify project pitfalls, communicate systemic issues, design and adjust project
policies and perform elementary risk-analysis.
Figure 9 illustrates the core theoretical sub-model to the comprehensive model
found in figure 13. It integrates a few of the more common policy decisions found in
information technology projects and centers on the Schedule Pressure variable, which
when increased or decreased throughout the project lifecycle can become both cause and
effect for second the third order project effects . Lyneis and Ford (2007) refer to these as
“ripple” and “knock-on” effects, which are the key causes of policy resistance.
Various project control efforts (e.g. adding more developers, working overtime)
cause ripple effects which are commonly understood as side effects to these wellintentioned managerial interventions. These ripple effects then produce second and third
order effects (e.g. errors/rework, out of sequence work), amplifying problems in the
project and feeding back throughout the systems structure to produce counter-intuitive
systemic project behaviors. Using these conceptual causal loop diagram models to
effectively communicate these dynamics is an important initial step towards
management’s improved understanding of the complex dynamics at play and their ability
to learn and develop appropriate intervention strategies (Hart 2008).
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Figure 9: Theoretical model illustrating common project schedule policy decisions and their systemic
cause-effect relationships. Adapted from Sterman (2000).

A software/web application development project under Schedule Pressure can
exhibit various behaviors that either lead to a reduction in Schedule Pressure or
unintentionally feedback to produce an unintended increase in Schedule Pressure. When
faced with Schedule Pressure, a project manager has an array of options to choose from
should intervention become necessary. For example, overtime can be instituted to make
up for lost time, the amount of time dedicated to each work package or task can be
reduced (i.e. Cutting Corners, B2 and R2 from figure 9), or the project manager can
decide to engage in concurrent development as referenced in both the R8 and B4 loops.
Each one of these interventions is designed to reduce schedule pressure by increasing the
rate of development; however, they each can produce unintended side effects that work to
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counter those intended gains in productivity (Sterman 2000). The B1 loop in figure 9
illustrates how an increase in overtime can increase the task completion rate, decrease the
work remaining and form a feedback balancing loop by reducing the schedule pressure;
however, R1 illustrates that an increase in overtime can also lead to developer fatigue, a
decrease in productivity, and a decrease in the task completion rate, which then leads to
an increase in the amount of work remaining and ultimately leads to more schedule
pressure (Sterman 2000).
Alternatively, the project manager could opt to reduce time per task (R2 loop in
figure 9), which would be designed to boost productivity and in the end reduce schedule
pressure; however, speeding up development by cutting corners can also increase the
error rate because developers become less concerned with following sound systems
development methodologies and instead focus on task completion regardless of the
negative costs associated with it such as software bugs, errors and reduced functionality.
Therefore, regardless of the intent of the policy, the reduction of time per task can often
times lead to reductions in productivity and subsequently feed back to ultimately increase
schedule pressure and perpetuate the negative feedback loop (Sterman 2000).
Another option the project manager might consider is to engage in concurrent
development (R8 and B4 of figure 9 by overlapping project work packages and/or phases
in attempt to increase the development rate and boost productivity. This is an increasingly
common practice in systems development (Ford and Sterman 2003) and is not without its
own set of negative repercussions. Ford and Sterman (2003) assert that regardless of
some success, implementing concurrent development has proven to be challenging for
many project managers mainly because it increases the amount of communication
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overhead (i.e. information transfers) between the project phases/tasks; therefore, more
tasks are begun using preliminary or incomplete information and specifications. This
leads to an increase in the number and length of iteration cycles, sometimes producing
what Taylor and Ford (2006) refer to as “tipping points” in development projects
whereby tipping point feedback structures push the project into “firefight mode” as errors
pile up in ever increasingly taxed rework cycle and, therefore, further degrade project
performance.
B4 of figure 9 illustrates how an increase in concurrent development strategies
increases the number of tasks being worked on simultaneously, which leads to an increase
in productivity and then feeds back to reduce schedule pressure. However, the increase in
concurrence can also increase the interdependency between tasks, which can increase the
error rate and after some delay lead to a decrease in productivity as more and more errors
enter the rework cycle (Ford and Sterman 2003, Taylor and Ford 2006).
c. Brooks’ Law
As the task completion rate of a project begins to decrease management
interventions such hiring and firing rates can increase, leading to the classic counterintuitive phenomenon found in software and systems development known as Brooks’
Law (figure 10), which states that adding developers to a late software project only
makes it later (Brooks 1975).
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Figure 10: Brooks Law. Adding developers to a late software project can make it later due to the
increase in communication and training required. This increase leads to lowered productivity,
lowered progress and the potential for more increases in hiring developers to work on the delayed
project. The balancing feedback to this loop is not represented here but will be covered in more
detail in figure 13.

As the task completion rate begins to decrease, project managers might decide to
intervene by adding more developers (i.e. an increase in the hiring rate), which increases
the communication overhead for the project, lowers the productivity and ultimately feeds
back to further degrade the task completion rate (Abdel-Hamid 1988, Abdel-Hamid
1990, Lyneis and Ford 2007). An increase in the hiring rate can also dilute the experience
levels for the team (R5 in figure 10), which in turn increases the training overhead,
lowers the productivity and ultimately feeds back to further decrease the task completion
rate. Furthermore, as team experience erodes it is also common to see an increase in the
error rate which also feeds back to lower productivity and pave the way for potential
increases in both schedule pressure and hiring rates.
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Figure 11: Causal loop diagram showing the interactions and relationships from figure 9 after
integrating the effects of Brooks' Law (figure 10) on project productivity.

d. Parkinson’s Law
Having tried all the other options, a project manager might also decide to push the
deadline of the project in an attempt to provide more time for the project team and
increase the probability for success (B3 in figure 12). While this practice increases the
time remaining and therefore should result in a decrease in schedule pressure, it also can
lead to Parkinson’s Law which states that work expands to equal the time allotted for it
(Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1989). A deadline push that increases the time remaining on
the project also increases slacking off which lowers productivity and feeds back to further
increase schedule pressure. In addition, it can also lead to a common software and
systems development practice called gold plating, whereby developers, with more time
due to the deadline push, decide to add superfluous features to software versions even
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though they were not scheduled to be part of the planned release cycle (Lyneis and Ford
2007). While this practice might initially appear to be a good use of the extra time, it
often times leads to additional errors that otherwise would not be in the rework cycle.
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Figure 12: Causal loop diagram showing the integration of variables such as "deadline slips" and
Parkinson's Law and the effects of those variables on the project team's productivity.

e. Integrated Project Dynamics Model
Once we integrate figures 9-12 into figure 13 the complex dynamics associated
with projects becomes increasingly apparent and the policy decisions made by project
managers are exposed as both cause and effect of both positive and negative feedback, as
well as both increases and decreases in project productivity. The model illustrates the
difficulty associated with project policy decisions and the counter-intuitive nature of
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those policy effects as they interact with an increasing amount of system variables, which
in turn alter system states in a non-linear fashion.
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Figure 13: Conceptual model designed to illustrate typical systemic project behaviors and their
causal connections Adapted from Sterman (2000), Lyneis and Ford (2007), Ford and Sterman (2003).

The conceptual model referenced in figure 13 does not account for some
additional variables that could contribute to schedule pressure such as, aggressive
deadlines set by management, overly optimistic assumptions of productivity and/or
quality, customer interventions, satisfaction levels or increases in customer feature
requests. For the purposes of this study those variables will be considered outside the
boundary scope and therefore exogenous to our system. The relevant concept is that
Schedule Pressure, the central variable for this model, is common in projects, and
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management interventions, in the form of traditional project control techniques, represent
both Schedule Pressure cause and effect.
f. Client Interactions
It is important to note that while the majority of research referenced in this paper
refers to ripple and knock-on feedback structures associated with internal project actions,
policy decisions and interventions, further reinforced by figure 13’s model boundary
which implicitly considers client interaction as exogenous to the system, external sources,
such as customers or clients, can trigger or amplify some of the aforementioned project
dynamics referenced in figure 13 (Rodrigues 1998). Rodrigues (1998) states that client
initiated scope creep, low-balled project proposals followed by change orders, as well as
deadline slips, all contribute to feedback dynamics that directly affect and degrade project
performance.
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Figure 14: Causal loop diagram illustrating the feedback structure associated with external
influences (e.g. clients/customers) on the internal project dynamics referenced in figure 13.
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Figure 14 illustrates some of these external source dynamics and demonstrates a
few important areas of concern regarding the impact of client behavior on project
performance. The dynamics associated with figure 14 could also be integrated into figure
13 and would demonstrate the added effect of client initiated scope creep on work
remaining. Client initiated scope creep can increase work remaining on a project as more
and more change requests or feature adds pile up. This can lead to an increase in schedule
pressure, deadline slips and a decrease in client trust. As client trust begins to degrade,
progress reporting usually begins to increase, which reduces productivity and further
degrades schedule performance. As deadline slips mount and client trust degrades, their
tolerance for future deadline slips also decreases, which in turn produces more schedule
pressure, more progress reporting and feeding back to further degrade schedule
performance. In the worst case contracting scenario, significant deadline slips can
ultimately lead to litigation efforts initiated by the client (USN, Laverghetta and Brown
1999, Sterman 2000), which divert and/or decrease project resources, leading to a
reduction in productivity and a further decrease in schedule performance.
g. Project Estimation Techniques
Given the importance of the project deadline and the schedule pressure that results
from that deadline, it is not surprising that some of the literature (Abdel-Hamid and
Madnick 1991) suggests how projects begin, and more specifically how their scope and
associated schedules are estimated, is of critical importance to the outcome of the project.
They assert that the most common method is one referred to as “estimation by analogy,”
whereby the project team uses historical data and experience as the guiding factors to
produce future work package estimates (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991). Abdel-
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Hamid and Madnick (1991) suggest that this common tendency to base future estimates
of a project’s (or work package’s) cost and schedule based on similar past project reveals
organizational bias in the scheduling process and can ultimately lead to higher project
costs and increasingly longer project schedules over time.
Estimates by
Analogy

Performance

R1

Schedule Length

Actions,
Decisions

Figure 15: Estimation by Analogy. Estimates influence schedules which influence actions and
decisions by the project team and management, which affects project performance ultimately
affecting the next project's estimates.

The logic follows that if one work package is analogous to another from previous
experience it should therefore require the same amount of time to complete. This method
makes several dangerous assumptions, most of which, if not all, can turn out to be false
as the project progresses and significantly reduce the probability of project success. First,
it assumes that the historical data driving the new estimate is not itself already bloated
with deliberate and/or excessive slack. Second, it assumes the same people, or different
people with the same skills sets, will be working those tasks. In addition, if there are
different people involved with the same skill sets it also assumes that those people will
work, make decisions and deliver an identical result in fit, form and function as compared
to the people that produce the original work package from which the estimate was made.
Third, it assumes that the interdependency of project tasks are not themselves dynamic
and that their relationships may vary in linearity from project to project. Lastly, it
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assumes that management interventions, actions or decisions, as well as those involving
the project team, will be the same for the new work package as they were for the one the
new estimate was based on.
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) assert that management’s tendency to cling to
unrealistic schedules by adding developers, instead of adjusting the project deadline to
more appropriately reflect the level of effort required to finish the project, is political in
nature. They suggest this happens for two reasons; first, project managers are hesitant to
show a slip in the project schedule “too early” in the project, and second, if they reestimate now they risk doing it again later and looking bad twice (Abdel-Hamid and
Madnick (1991). This type of political decision making in projects can also become
unintentionally institutionalized and consequently ignored by management as one of the
potential causes for reductions in project performance, as well as unnecessary increases
in schedule pressure and the down-stream dynamics associated with that increase.

Underestimation

+
Actual Amount
of Work

+
Human Resource
Level

+
Rework
R1

B1
+
Project Cost

+

-

Pressure on
management to
cut corners
-

Quality
Standards

Figure 16: This causal loop diagram illustrates management's tendency to cling to unrealistic project
schedules (underestimated) by simply adding more people to the project. This produces an increase
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in project cost leading to an increase in pressure to cut corners (B1). That pressure can reduce
human resource levels, but does so at the expense of quality standards. As quality standards decrease
rework increases, further increasing the project’s actual amount of work.

Some of this political decision making is guided by conventional wisdom in the
project management community, as well as research from two empirical studies and an
informal review of over 500 completed contracts, stating that when “a contract is more
than 15 percent complete, the [final] overrun at completion will not be less than the
overrun to date, and the [final] percent overrun at completion will be greater than the
percent overrun to date” (Christensen 1993, 45). In addition, Christensen (1993, 45)
states that “once a contract is 20 percent complete, the cumulative Cost Performance
Index (CPI) does not change more than 10 percent; in fact, in most cases it only
worsens.” Given these project management industry rules of thumb, it becomes obvious
that the pressure to not show a schedule slip early in the project life cycle produces a
dynamic whereby project managers choose to add developers and cost to the project
instead of analyzing estimates and potentially re-estimating scopes and schedules to
achieve a better target end date, which in turn reinforces the dynamics associated with
Brooks’ Law (figure 10).

1V. System Archetypes as Project and Organizational Learning Tools
The study of system archetypes as project learning tools is another contribution
the system dynamics methodology makes to the project management discipline. These
generic system structures provide a conceptual foundation so that project teams can
identify common generic project variables and their associated dynamics, communicate
their cause-effect relationships, map them to the project or issue at hand and plan
effective intervention strategies for mitigating problematic project behavior. Effective
learning usually requires some level of pattern recognition; system archetypes provide
these project patterns, which can be analyzed to improve performance.
Both Meadows (2008) and Sterman (2000) provide detail on system archetypes as
they relate to generic system behavior; however, Hart (2008) takes these system
archetype concepts a step further using software engineering, and various real-world
software case studies, to illustrate archetypes as they relate to the software development
process. Hart’s (2008) research, and associated exploration into system archetypes
applied to software engineering, provides an IT project manager with a solid foundation
for analyzing typical software project behaviors and designing intervention strategies to
mitigate the risks inherent in those software engineering system archetypes. While there
are several system archetypes to learn from, the scope of this paper will limit us to a
discussion on two areas common to systems/software development – software quality and
process improvement efforts.
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a. Drifting Goals – Software Quality Erosion
The first archetype we will explore is the Drifting Goals archetype. Senge (1990),
Meadows (2008) and Hart (2008) all describe this archetype as a situation whereby
organizational/project goals are allowed to drift or slowly erode to a state that is
ultimately unacceptable to the organization; however, because it happens slowly over an
extended period of time it goes unnoticed or becomes institutionalized into the business
process. Meadows (2008, 122) refers to this phenomenon as the “boiled frog syndrome”
and suggests, “some systems not only resist policy and stay in a bad state, they keep
getting worse.” A frog’s biology for sensing danger is hard-wired to sudden
environmental changes, not gradual ones; therefore, if you place a frog in water at room
temperature and slowly turn up the heat to a boiling level it will be content until it is too
late to save itself (Senge 1990). Project delays, communication issues and inaccurate
project control data can all have the same effect on a project, turning a slow gradual
decline in performance into outright project failure.
The systemic structure of the drifting goals archetype, as referenced in figure 17,
provides the project manager with a generic understanding of the dynamics surrounding
goal erosion behavior. Figure 18, takes this concept a step further and applies it to
software development to illustrate the unintended consequences of goal erosion with
regards to software quality standards.
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Project
Performance Goal

Actual Project
Performance

B1

+
Performance Gap

B2
Drifting Goals

Project Control
+
Project Peformance
Improvement Interventions

+

# of Adjustments to
Project Goals

Figure 17: Generic structure of the drifting goals archetype

The behavior over time we are concerned with here is either the increase or
decrease of both Project Performance Goal and Actual Project Performance over time.
The Performance Gap variable is the difference between the Project Performance Goal
and the Actual Project Performance. When the gap increases, it produces two systemic
reactions; the first (B1) is the project control loop which states that as the Performance
Gap increases, so do project team interventions to improve performance, and as Project
Performance Improvement Interventions increase Actual Project Performance increases,
albeit most often after some amount of delay. This delay is important because as it
increases it produces a sentiment among team members that fixes are failing and/or
improving the project performance is a fruitless effort, which ultimately triggers the
introduction of the B2 loop – the Drifting Goals loop. This feedback mechanism results
in a balancing feedback loop that increases the # of Adjustments to Project Goals when
the Performance Gap increases. Those interventions then reduce the Project
Performance Goal and ultimately reduce the Performance Gap, which makes the team
believe they are succeeding, even though the reality is that should this behavior continue
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it can result in a continued degradation of project performance when one accepts a
variable like software quality as an appropriate measure of project performance.
Figure 18 illustrates these drifting goals dynamic as it applies the erosion of
software quality over time. For the purposes of this example, we will continue the
practice of considering software quality as an appropriate measure of project
performance, which according to Hart (2008) is a function of delivered functionality and
software defects.

Customer
+ Expectations
R1
Be Careful What
You Wish For

Actual Quality

+
Quality Goals

+

+
Quality Gap

B1
Quality
Improvement
Actions to Improve
Quality

B2
Drifting Goals

+

+

Actions to Lower
Quality Goals

Short-term
Success +
+

Pressure to Declare
Success

Figure 18: The erosion of software quality. Software project related example of the drifting goals
archetype (Hart 2008).

Most, if not all, software development projects are forced to deal with the cost vs.
schedule vs. quality dilemma. Software quality can degrade over time as quality goals
shift due to increased pressure to deliver products on time and under budget (i.e. pressure
to declare success). Figure 18 is designed to illustrate the dynamics behind this dilemma.
Like figure 17, the Quality Gap is the difference between the Quality Goal and the Actual
Quality. Hart (2008) suggests that this gap produces three main dynamics. First are the
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system interventions or Actions to Improve Quality (B1), such as testing and process
improvement techniques. Second are the Actions to Lower Quality Goals such as
releasing a product prior to testing it properly and reworking errors. These actions are
usually a result of pressure to declare success and the fact that the Actions to Improve
Quality are often expensive and time consuming; the logic is that the customer is still
using the product right now and not complaining that much so why not. Hart (2008)
suggests that in general, the reality is that people tend to tolerate software that is beneath
their expectations or standards. Third are the Customer Expectations, which when
considered as part of the system equation produce the potential dynamic whereby
software of acceptable quality gets worse over time. If the Actual Quality of the software
decreases, so does the Customer’s Expectation of that software, which reduces the
Quality Goals, reduces the Quality Gap, reduces the Actions to Improve Quality and in
turn further reduces the Actual Quality of the software. The erosion of software quality,
as illustrated in figure 18, is therefore a systemic problem including both the project team
and the customer.
b. Limits to Growth – The Paradox of Process Improvements
The second archetype to briefly explore is the limits to growth archetype
mentioned in the literature (Senge 1990, Meadows 2008, Hart 2009). Hart (2008) suggest
this to be the generic structure associated with the aforementioned 90% syndrome in
projects; and while Lyneis and Ford (2007), Ford and Sterman (2003) and Abdel-Hamid
(1991) don’t specifically reference the limits to growth system archetype in their
research, their research on the 90% syndrome describes a system structure and behavior
that is consistent with this archetype.
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R1
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Project
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+
-

+
Limiting Condition

Limit to Growth

Figure 19: Simple generic system structure of a limits to growth archetype.

This limits to growth archetype is simple in nature and revolves around the
Project Performance variable, which when increased causes a positive feedback loop
(R1), increasing Productivity and further increasing Project Performance. This growth
spiral does have its limits though, represented in the B1 loop, whereby some constraint on
the system produces a limiting condition (e.g. the number of developers writing code is a
constraint that produces a limiting condition), which ultimately balances out the system,
reduces project performance and ultimately demonstrates the limits to growth archetype.
Figure 20 illustrates this limits to growth concept as it applies to project
management with an example Hart (2008) refers to as the process improvement paradox.
For the purpose of this example, the causal loop diagram has been kept relatively
simplistic so as to clearly demonstrate the archetype; however, this dynamic could easily
be integrated into figure 13’s overarching structure, and if you look closely, while the
variables names are different, the concepts overlap with two of the loops – B1 and R1.
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Figure 20: Project management specific example of a limits to growth archetype (Hart 2008).

B1 of figure 20, or the Closing the Schedule Gap balancing loop, illustrates that as
Schedule Variance (i.e. the difference between where you hoped to be in the project
schedule and where you actually are) increases, Work Intensity increases, which can
cause an increase in Production, an increase in Completed Tasks, and therefore, a
decrease in Schedule Variance. However, increases in Work Intensity can also lead to a
degradation of Process Improvement Efforts among the project team, as more time is
dedicated to completing tasks and less time is therefore dedicated to improving
project/production processes in order to increase Production Capacity. R1, and more
specifically the relationship between Work Intensity and Process Improvement Efforts,
clearly demonstrates the limits to growth archetype in systems and provides project
managers with the foundation for applying these concepts, as well as their associated
interventions, to better improve their project performance.
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c. Inter vs. Intra Project Learning
The organization, or team learning process, is of critical importance for project
success and the study and application of system archetypes aid in that learning process.
Kotnour (2000) suggests there are two forms of learning in a project environment –
“inter-project learning” and “intra-project learning”. The goal of inter-project learning is
to increase project and team learning acumen; it is the knowledge assimilation,
combination and dissemination of lessons learned across projects to facilitate knowledge
creation, and ultimately, better project performance (Kotnour 2000). The dissemination
process is critical for organizations interested in mitigating the risks of perpetuating poor
project performance across both similar and disparate projects. Assimilation and
combination involves the post-mortem analysis of a project, which is an important project
plan phase (Kotnour 2000).
However, this inter-project learning (i.e. post-mortem) process alone does not
provide a panacea for solving problematic project behaviors and mitigating the risks of
their associated outcomes. Equally important is to engage in the accompanying practice
Kotnour (2000) describes as “intra-project learning,” whereby the project team develops
methods and processes for capturing near real-time project data (e.g. number of software
bugs released to production) and integrates that data into the project lifecycle, creating
knowledge and improving project decision making. While this practice should
accompany inter-project learning, it often times does not, as more effort and resources are
often times applied to the project’s close out phase, or post-mortem analysis, in support
of the next project.
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The study and development of system archetypes primarily falls within the
domain of inter-project learning; however, as this paper will discuss later, they can also
be used for intra-project learning when one considers the theoretical integration of system
dynamics models with the traditional project management process framework as outlined
by the Project Management Institute’s Project Management Body of Knowledge (2008).
Further discussion regarding this novel practice will be presented later in Chapter V.
Intra-project learning focuses on the task of individual projects with the goal of
producing a successful project outcome, to build individual and team capabilities, and
ultimately, to support inter-project learning as the data that is captured during the project
is then assimilated, combined and distributed in support of that mission (Kotnour 2000).
It identifies, analyzes and solves problems during the course of a project as opposed to
the post-mortem methodology, a method widely used in both traditional project
management processes and system dynamics analysis to projects (USN, T. Laverghetta and
Brown USN 1999), which relies on project data captured during a project to provide insight

into how to improve performance on future projects.
Unfortunately, because the very definition of a project according to the Project
Management Institute’s Body of Knowledge (2008, 5) is that of a “temporary endeavor
undertaken to create a unique product, service or result,” it stands to reason that solely
relying on inter-project learning as a strategy for increased project and organizational
performance is myopic; particularly when one considers that projects vary in
requirements, complexity and dynamics from one project to the next. This consideration
underpins the foundation for research, (Rodrigues and Bowers 1996, Rodrigues and
Williams 1998, Williams 1999, Williams 2003, Taylor and Ford 2006, Lyneis and Ford
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2007) in both the system dynamics and project management communities, that attempts
to improve traditional project management processes and methods by modifying,
replacing, and in some cases, augmenting them to better govern contemporary project
dynamics and effectively integrate new models into the existing project management
framework as outlined by PMI (2008).

V. Discussion: Integration of System Dynamics with Traditional Methods and
Suggestions for Future Research
Williams (1999) and Rodrigues (1997) provide a rough outline for this new
methodology – the integration of dynamic models with traditional project management
methodologies, and other areas in the literature (Lyneis and Ford 2007, Taylor and Ford
2006, Lyneis and Cooper 2001, Rodrigues and Bowers 1996, Klein 2007, Hart 2008,
Haas 2009) also suggest the need to re-examine the use of our traditional techniques for
project management in an attempt to develop better strategic, as well as tactical,
methodologies. Many of the current operational models, while useful, are lacking in a
holistic/systems approach to project management; therefore, integration of system
dynamics models into the entire project management framework, and not solely as a postmortem analysis tool to support inter-project learning and knowledge dissemination,
represents a novel practice in the project management field and one that could potentially
benefit project teams as well as the organizations they support.
This augmented project management framework would be designed to better
manage projects in real-time and provide functioning quantitative models that project
managers could use during a project instead of just after the project in support of the next.
These models would be integrated into the traditional project management toolset (PERT,
CPA,WBS, OBS, Network Diagramming) and lifecycle in a way that shares project data
(e.g. % of tasks completed for a particular work package, or number of software defects
released to production) in near real-time with the previously mentioned operational tools
used to plan and control projects.
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At this stage in its evolutionary development, system dynamics models applied to
project management are predominantly used as post-mortem tools and occasionally as
models used prospectively (e.g. estimation techniques). Progress towards this next step of
integration into the entire project life cycle (see figure 21) is currently more of an
academic exercise than a mature methodology. The literature at this point does not
suggest any real-world case of this novel approach to augmenting the project manager’s
tool set. The literature does, however, consistently emphasize the need for new models to
adapt to the ever increasing complex nature of information technology projects, as well as
to improve the mediocre performance that continues to plague the industry.

Figure 21: Conceptual model of the integration of system dynamics models (SD Models) in the
traditional project management framework. Lessons learned and modeling ‘what if” scenario results
are aggregated at the strategic level and continuously fed into the traditional plan and control project
management framework.

Models that originated from the defense and aerospace engineering projects of the
1950’s are useful but need to be augmented with more contemporary, quantitative and
dynamic models that allow project managers the ability to test “what-if” scenarios (e.g.
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will adding developers at the later stages of this project make the project stall even more)
before, during and after their projects in an attempt to facilitate knowledge creation
throughout the entire project life-cycle and organizational learning prowess among all
project team members. Properly and continually calibrated system dynamics models,
using as close to real-time project status data as possible, integrated into a project
manager’s tool set (see figure 21) could serve many purposes including:
1. Effective project management training, mentoring and skill set building.
The use of CLDs and quantitative stock and flow simulation models could
provide project managers with a learning environment that enables them to
see the feedback structures present in a particular project management
problem (e.g. client scope changes) and run simulations to test/validate
their managerial intuition on how best to intervene. These tests could serve
to educate managers on the 2nd and 3rd order effects of their interventions
and where in the system it is best to intervene (i.e. which levers to adjust).
2. Improved project estimation and risk analysis/mitigation techniques
3. Dynamically adaptive project plans/network diagrams
4. Scenario analysis used to plan intervention strategies should problems
arise throughout the course of the project and post-mortem analysis to
support the project’s close-out phase and facilitate inter-project learning.
Intervention strategies must also be adaptive given the complex nature of
modern-day IT projects and the challenges this type of knowledge-work
presents.
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Rodrigues and Williams (1998) developed a conceptual model called the Project
Management Integrated Model (PMIM) for how this integration might look and broke it
down into both a System Dynamics Operational Model (SDOM), as well as a System
Dynamics Strategic Model (SDSM). They suggest using the integration of system
dynamics models as a way to develop a more sophisticated approach to project network
models that would include feedback processes designed to deliver more effective
modeling of project activity durations and costs (Rodrigues and Williams 1998). In
addition to the integration of system dynamics models with the established project
management processes, Rodrigues (2001) also suggests the use of system dynamics
modeling within the Project Management Body of Knowledge risk management
processes, thereby providing an alternative, yet complementary, method for managing
project risks.
Unfortunately, at this stage in its evolution, the literature suggests little has been
done to normalize, implement and test these integrated models in practical organizational
situations. While this represents undoubtedly a massive undertaking, it is one which has
the potential to positively influence the direction of project management research and
practice; further research in this area is warranted. Simply identifying lessons learned at
the end of a project, and using those lessons as a means to improve future project
performance, is insufficient to advancing the performance rate of information technology
projects and the project management discipline in general. The delay associated with
team learning and the development of effective management interventions must be
reduced; knowledge creation, combination, assimilation and dissemination, as well as
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risk mitigation strategies and tactics, must be developed and implemented throughout the
entire life-cycle of the project, not just at the end of a project and in support of the next.
In addition to the integration of system dynamics models and simulation into the
traditional project management framework, the use of system archetypes as a project
management learning tools should also be further researched, developed and applied to
specific areas of project management such as information systems projects and web
application development. While there will always be overlap in the concepts explored in
these system archetypes, different project types, such as the development of complex and
diversely distributed cloud computing applications, call for specific examples to be
developed, validated and circulated amongst project management professionals. This
knowledge creation and dissemination process could facilitate the development of a new,
more systems-thinking oriented world view for the discipline.
However, while the use of system dynamics as a project team learning tool is of
particular importance to advancing the project management field, we should not limit the
discussion to simply using these tools as strictly an education tool. More research must be
done to propagate the use of system dynamics as not just an academic exercise, but also
as a strategic planning and project control toolset that project managers can use to
dynamically and adaptively manage complex projects throughout their entire life-cycle. It
is important to note, however, that integrating system dynamics modeling and simulation
techniques into the entire project life-cycle would not work very well on novel projects.
Projects where an organization has relatively decent experience would represent fertile
ground for this type of new approach. For example, if an organization is experimenting
with new technology, new business processes and/or a type of project it has never
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engaged in before, the integration of system dynamics models into the project
management process will not only be lacking in value-added, it might actually detract
from the end-result and hinder progress because there is no historical data available from
which one could effectively initially calibrate the model. Projects that become somewhat
repeatable (e.g. developing a management information system for a government
organization) are good examples of where this integration would be applicable. Even
though these projects are unique in nature, they should contain enough similar project
variables and dynamics to calibrate a model with minor adjustments and account for
some of the project’s unique elements.
Lastly, more research and development could go into expanding the project
dynamics covered in section III; taking some of those concepts one step further into the
development of quantitative system dynamics stock and flow models, derived from the
project behavior dynamics CLDs. These models could be used to produce adaptive
strategic models and simulations, which would enhance both the project managers’ skill
and tool set, as well as provide a much need augmentation to traditional project
management processes.

VI. Conclusions
The current state of information technology project performance is unacceptable
and its failures are well documented in the literature. The discipline is poorly researched
relative to other management disciplines and, coupled with the near exponential growth
of technical and project complexity in the information technology industry, it is
becoming increasingly evident that new systems-based models must be adopted for the
field to advance and attempt to improve upon its mediocre performance rate. These new
models do not necessarily need to replace traditional methods, but instead should
augment them to produce a hybrid, or best-of-breed approach to managing complex
IT/systems projects.
Because the nature and complexity of a project should dictate the method by
which it is controlled, the project management discipline must continue to develop its
operational and strategic methods and not continue to solely rely on reductionist methods
that were developed more than half a century ago and apply more to the types of projects
that originated out of that era. A new era of highly complex, deadline driven knowledgework based information technology projects has developed in recent decades and dictates
we take a holistic approach to project control, or suffer the consequences for ignoring to
do so. This failure to properly adapt our methodologies and processes has been cited in
the literature as both cause and effect for low project performance rates, the 90%
syndrome or outright project failure. Adjustments to traditional models, the development
of new models and the integration of both where appropriate, must be done to effectively
account for the new complexities introduced by the global information age.
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Moreover, project management professionals should seek to develop new
competencies in systems-thinking approaches to project management, as well as the
modeling and simulation tools needed to aid in that development. This expansion of core
competencies would appropriately augment the current knowledge base that favors the
types of reductionist approaches advanced by the Project Management Institute. The use
of system dynamics benefits the discipline in many ways including, improvements in
management training in the form of dynamic "flight simulator" models, management
skill-set building, estimation and risk analysis techniques, project plans and network
diagrams, what if" based scenario analysis used to craft effective intervention strategies,
as well as a “best-of-breed” approach to management where the appropriate tools are
used in the appropriate situations instead of being universally applied.
This area of research has just begun to tackle the project performance problem
and will continue to search for new and improved methods for advancing the discipline.
The value of system dynamics to project management is in its approach to effectively
capture, communicate and strategically address project behavior issues using a systems
approach that integrates both "soft" and "hard" variables into the model's equations. This
is understandably a monumental task, especially when one considers the difficulty in
adjudicating the validity of certain measures associated with soft variables; however, to
ignore this task because debates over how to quantify certain aspects of a project can be
contentious, is myopic in its approach and one might argue less effective because the
model deliberately ignores the "reality on the ground," and consequently, is not
representative of the system's true behavioral elements. System dynamics models applied
to project management seek to be more inclusive of the project's true reality and,
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therefore, should be developed and matured into useful tools to improve performance that
are widely disseminated and developed throughout the project management community.
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